Louisville Courier Journal Editorial: The Afghan Papers.
The Afghan papers
The first thing that should be done about the huge archive of classified military documents concerning the war in Afghanistan made public last weekend is to dispel the notion that they are on a level with the Pentagon Papers of the Vietnam era or with the release of the records of the Stasi secret police in East Germany.
The former lifted back the veil of a web of deception and error that explained how the United States had blundered into an unjustified and far deadlier conflict in Southeast Asia. The other laid out how a Stalinist state's agents (successor to the Gestapo, no less) extended its tentacles into every branch of an Orwellian society.
The Afghan papers, in fact, tell little that is new. Moreover, because the documents posted at WikiLeaks stop at about the time President Obama escalated the conflict, some are of questionable relevance. Finally, since many are raw intelligence reports or battlefield dispatches, it is often impossible to gauge their accuracy.
It is appropriate that attention be directed to the actual leaking of the classified material. WikiLeaks attempted to redact names of people who could be endangered by exposure, and The New York Times , the British newspaper The Guardian and the German magazine Der Spiegel (all of which published excerpts) took even greater pains. Nonetheless, names of American personnel and of some foreign agents, particularly Pakistani and Afghan, are revealed. Defense and intelligence officials seem to think that damaging disclosures will be rare, if they exist at all. But in wartime some things must be kept secret, and there is no telling what the next batch of leaks might contain.
As strongly as we believe in transparency and oppose excessive secrecy, an investigation into the leaks is warranted.
That said, the leaked six-year archive is now in the public domain, and there are important points to bear in mind about its content and impact.
Grim conclusions
One is that while little information is actually new, the cumulative effect of the reports is a grim one. It underscores how difficult the war is, how unreliable Afghan troops and police are, the pervasiveness of official Afghan corruption, the corrosive effect of civilian casualties and how adversely the Bush administration's long and tragic distraction with Iraq affected the military effort and U.S. morale. The sheer weight of these problems is sobering.
A second is that many of the documents shed light on the role of Pakistani intelligence officers, some of whom are clearly playing both sides. This, too, is not a new insight. The important thing is for both the United States and Pakistan to remember how much they need each other — a mutually recognized reality reflected in the implicit Pakistani approval of attacks by U.S. drone aircraft in Taliban-infested areas of Pakistan and by more rigorous Pakistani military action in recent months against terrorist organizations.
'Two-faced' approach
Some of Pakistan's two-faced approach is dictated by history — the Americans abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 — and some by its desire to avoid letting its archenemy India gain influence among the Afghans. Clearly, it is in the American interest to act as a peacemaker between India and Pakistan whenever possible. But even conservative critics credit the Obama administration with forging a better and more constructive relationship with Pakistan, and that must not be abandoned.
Finally, although the documents are informative, they do not seem to be game-changers in deciding how to proceed in Afghanistan. Unlike Vietnam, Afghanistan knowingly harbored a terrorist force that carried out deadly attacks on American soil. The mission in Afghanistan must be to create circumstances under which Afghanistan will not again become a staging ground for attacks on the United States, its allies or its vital interests. The debate about Afghanistan should center on whether the U.S. is pursuing a strategy that will accomplish that goal and, if not, on what, if anything, can be done to make success more likely.
To read the Afghan archive excerpts and to conclude that war is hell is simply to embrace a cliché. To read them and to be reminded that the war is going badly in many respects — and to ask whether success still can be achieved and, if so, how — would lead the nation toward a debate it badly needs to have.
The first thing that should be done about the huge archive of classified military documents concerning the war in Afghanistan made public last weekend is to dispel the notion that they are on a level with the Pentagon Papers of the Vietnam era or with the release of the records of the Stasi secret police in East Germany.
The former lifted back the veil of a web of deception and error that explained how the United States had blundered into an unjustified and far deadlier conflict in Southeast Asia. The other laid out how a Stalinist state's agents (successor to the Gestapo, no less) extended its tentacles into every branch of an Orwellian society.
The Afghan papers, in fact, tell little that is new. Moreover, because the documents posted at WikiLeaks stop at about the time President Obama escalated the conflict, some are of questionable relevance. Finally, since many are raw intelligence reports or battlefield dispatches, it is often impossible to gauge their accuracy.
It is appropriate that attention be directed to the actual leaking of the classified material. WikiLeaks attempted to redact names of people who could be endangered by exposure, and The New York Times , the British newspaper The Guardian and the German magazine Der Spiegel (all of which published excerpts) took even greater pains. Nonetheless, names of American personnel and of some foreign agents, particularly Pakistani and Afghan, are revealed. Defense and intelligence officials seem to think that damaging disclosures will be rare, if they exist at all. But in wartime some things must be kept secret, and there is no telling what the next batch of leaks might contain.
As strongly as we believe in transparency and oppose excessive secrecy, an investigation into the leaks is warranted.
That said, the leaked six-year archive is now in the public domain, and there are important points to bear in mind about its content and impact.
Grim conclusions
One is that while little information is actually new, the cumulative effect of the reports is a grim one. It underscores how difficult the war is, how unreliable Afghan troops and police are, the pervasiveness of official Afghan corruption, the corrosive effect of civilian casualties and how adversely the Bush administration's long and tragic distraction with Iraq affected the military effort and U.S. morale. The sheer weight of these problems is sobering.
A second is that many of the documents shed light on the role of Pakistani intelligence officers, some of whom are clearly playing both sides. This, too, is not a new insight. The important thing is for both the United States and Pakistan to remember how much they need each other — a mutually recognized reality reflected in the implicit Pakistani approval of attacks by U.S. drone aircraft in Taliban-infested areas of Pakistan and by more rigorous Pakistani military action in recent months against terrorist organizations.
'Two-faced' approach
Some of Pakistan's two-faced approach is dictated by history — the Americans abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 — and some by its desire to avoid letting its archenemy India gain influence among the Afghans. Clearly, it is in the American interest to act as a peacemaker between India and Pakistan whenever possible. But even conservative critics credit the Obama administration with forging a better and more constructive relationship with Pakistan, and that must not be abandoned.
Finally, although the documents are informative, they do not seem to be game-changers in deciding how to proceed in Afghanistan. Unlike Vietnam, Afghanistan knowingly harbored a terrorist force that carried out deadly attacks on American soil. The mission in Afghanistan must be to create circumstances under which Afghanistan will not again become a staging ground for attacks on the United States, its allies or its vital interests. The debate about Afghanistan should center on whether the U.S. is pursuing a strategy that will accomplish that goal and, if not, on what, if anything, can be done to make success more likely.
To read the Afghan archive excerpts and to conclude that war is hell is simply to embrace a cliché. To read them and to be reminded that the war is going badly in many respects — and to ask whether success still can be achieved and, if so, how — would lead the nation toward a debate it badly needs to have.
Labels: News reporting
posted by KYJurisDoctor at 11:55 AM
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